Kaptelinin & Nardi – Chapter 3 of Acting with Technology
Feb-2011
Kaptelinin, Victor, and Bonnie A. Nardi. “Chapter 3: Activity Theory in a Nutshell.” Acting with Technology: Activity Theory and Interaction Design. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006. 29-73. Print.
- In this chapter N/K introduce the historical genesis of AT before moving on to describe the core tenants. Using Leontiev and Vygotsky’s “cultural-historical tradition” the authors do the following: 1) discuss AT in general; 2) present a historical overview of the development of the main ideas underyling AT; and 3) summarize the basic principles.
- N/K note that activity theory has a basis in psychology and other social sciences. It was developed as a way to understand individual human beings, as well as the “social entities” they compose in the everyday. To do this, AT analyzes the “genesis, structure, and processes” of human activity (31).
- Activity defined: not only human activity but the activity of any subject. This subject undergoes a “purposeful interaction of the subject in the world, a process in which mutual transformations between the poles of ‘subject-object’ are accomplished (N/K 31, Leontiev 1978).
- In this analytic, activity is understood as the most basic category of analysis. This means the activity that occurs between subject and object. . . AT dismisses this view as it places either the subject or object out on their own, non interrelated with all the other subjects and objects that surround it. This is the reason it is called activity theory, not subject-object theory.
- Core tenants:
o Activity is the most basic category of analysis – it is the basic “unit of analysis.”
o No properties of the subject or the object exist before and beyond activities
o Activity is viewed as central to the development of both the subject and the object. This means that developmental changes that occur through activity will effect the future properties of the subject when interacting with objects in the future (32).
- In AT, the “subject” is something that lives and acts in the world – it has needs and must act to meet those needs. As such, the subject has agency; however, because the object also produces effects through interaction it too has agency. As N/K put it, “The very notion of interaction implies mutual effects produced by both sides on each other” (33). Despite this co-structuring thesis, the authors note that the subjects agency is of a different hue – it can be defined as “the ability and the need to act” (33).
- The precursor of AT was “cultural-historical psychology” as developed by Vygotsky and his colleagues in Russia during the 1920s & 1930s. CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) is the approach that incorporates both Vygotsky’s cultural-historical psychology and Leontiev’s activity theory. Some of the core tenants of this early psychosociology:
o The unity of consciousness and activity – This held that the human mind was/is developed as a way to interact with and make sense of the world (think distributed cognition). An analysis of mind would therefore necessitate an analysis of the material world that interacts with it.
o The social nature of the human mind – Similar to the last tenant, this posits that the human mind is deeply shaped and influenced by its interactions with society/culture. This meant that an emphasis on social activity would yield more useful results than psychological research into “subjective or objective phenomena” (these usually took the form of introspective psychology or behaviorism). Jean Piaget’s constructivist psychological approach had the most in common with CHAT; however, instead of understanding activity as embedded in the social, constructivism sought out a biological explanation that understood activity as a push toward equilibrium with environment. Piaget’s thesis: “cognitive functions and abilities are constructed by individuals in their continuing attempts to strike an equilibrium with their environment” (38). This differed only in that CHAT was not about the entire environment but more about culture.
- Vygotsky argued that mind shouldn’t be understood as something that simply is influenced by the external environment; rather, mind is produced by interaction with the external (society/culture). To see this in action Vygotsky claimed that “the only way to reveal the impact of culture on the mind was to follow developmental, historical transformations of mental phenomena in the social and cultural context” (39).
- The General Methodology of Developmental Research – (I find there to be a lot of convergences here with the way that Reid describes “multiplicity” in the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari). This method argues that one must identify the “germ” or the most basic, initial form of the analyzed phenomenon. Once identified the researcher would follow the emergence and future transformations of the germ into different forms. This would not mean concentrating on the germs “elements” or essential qualities; rather, it would mean concentrating on the germs “units” or the relationship of the components that constitutes the germ (think of the intensive multiplicity). This led to research that discovered that the boundary between mind and society isn’t so clear (41).
- Vygotsky’s “higher psychological functions” – contrasted with natural psychological functions (perception, memory), these emerge as the result of an individual mind’s interaction with the culture that surrounds it. These higher psychological functions are the result of the natural psychological functions interacting with technical and psychological tools (the results of culture that mediate experience) to produce “instrumental acts” or actions that are cultural-psychological in lineage and mediate activity. Vygotsky never differentiated between psychological tools as physical (art, maps, diagrams, blueprints) or symbolic (language, numeric systems); however, he realized that after an extended period of time the external mediators are often internalized, changing the nature of thought (43). The increase of internalization occurs through socialization and time. This led to an understanding of the restructuring of mental processes as a result of development in cultural environment. So, in the example presented, young children had no mediation abilities, middle-schoolers relied on “external mediation” and university students relied on “internal mediation resulting from internalization” (45). The implication of this is that objects out there in the world that mediate activity can become internalized (or turned into part of the subject).
- The implications of the internalization principle resituated the individual-collective: the difference between an individual and others is actually no difference at all; rather, most activity is part of a continuum that exists between the two poles. Result: the universal law of psychological development, or, the idea that psychological functions start out on a social level (interpsychological) and are slowly internalized into the individual (intrapsychological). Also known as the zone of proximal development.
- Leontiev began his research by trying to demonstrate how the idea of “mind” in evolution with “culture” creates consciousness. He started this project by trying to determine when “psyche” emerged in the history of man (51). L. made his argument about the emergence of “psyche” this way:
o All organisms develop evolutionarily because of their responsiveness to environment.
o Responsiveness takes two forms: 1) biological effects (food triggers digestion); and 2) sensitivity (symbolic responses or non-biological responses to signals that carry biologically significant information). Sensitivity is the first instance of “psyche.”
- Activity is the specific cognitive process wherein the subject realizes his own reality (i.e., the monkey “realizing” that a stick can help him get a banana). This means that any activity is object-oriented.
- While developing his research on the development of mind, Leontiev took three aspects of culture: tools, language, and the division of labor (56). The division of labor – or the activity of being engaged in socially distributed work activity wherein one’s actions are motivated by an object but directed to another – constitutes a significant development of mind because “When an individual takes part in a socially distributed activity, the difference between motivation and the directing objects is forced on the individual by the organization of the activity. The division of labor makes disassociated between the motivation and the direction of the activity an objective attribute of an individual’s interaction with the world. Internalization of this disassociation changes the structure of individual activities. Individual activities can develop a complex relationship between motivating and directing objects” (58).
- The motive – in AT the motive is the object that motivates the action (So, in the case of the person typing on the keyboard, the motive isn’t to hit the key or to type a sentence, the motive object is the novel that the person is typing). So, in other words, “an activity may be composed of a sequence of steps, each of which is not immediately related to the motive even though the sequence as a whole may eventually result in attaining the motive: (62).
- The three levels of human activity:
o Activity – the top layer, this is directed at motive (the object that excites the subject).
o Actions – the components of activity that might not appear to directly be related to the motive but are directed toward goals or achievements).
o Operations – routine processes that provide an adjustment of action – they are usually unconscious, internalized, auomatized, or improvised.
- Functional organs – combinations of human capabilities with artifacts to allow for extended human capabilities (think night vision goggles). Functional organs require “tool related competencies” in order ft function.
- K/N end the chapter with a recap of all the material in 65-72. Revisit for synopsis.