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Jan 22nd 10 Posted by justin in CCR711

CCR711 – Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Cape

Plato – Phaedrus[1]

First, I’ll give a recap of the speech:

A. Phaedrus begins the speech, which starts with the notion that the lover is a mad man, that is, insane with desire. This insanity is damaging to the lover and the beloved.

1. This speech of Lysias is cynical at this point, describing a physical, selfish love.

2. The speech itself is badly written, a parody actually, which shows the weakness and corruption of the thought behind it. Plato has a reason for writing it in this way. Socrates fears that this speech will corrupt Phaedrus, who is quite taken by it, and, in turn, Socrates makes derogatory and ironic comments about the speech of Lysias.

B. Socrates refutes the speech with a speech of his own.

1. He puts a cloak over his head and delivers an improved version of the Lysias speech. It is better, but still not as good as his final speech at the end of the dialogue.

2. Socrates starts out by defining love, and he organizes the speech much better than Lysias did.

3. At this point, what Socrates says about love is in the realm of right opinion as opposed to true knowledge.

4. He appears, in part to agree with Lysias’ idea of love (an irrational desire for the object of the desire). But he then breaks off when he realizes that he has praised what to him is a non-lover.

5. At this point, Plato works in mention of the ancient Greek lyric poets Ibycus and Stesichorus.

6. Socrates is becoming dithyrambic, and wants to leave. Phaedrus asks him to stay; it is “scorching noon”

7. Socrates’ daimon orders him to stay and make up for his impiety 9in talking about love in the way he has; the gods have overheard him and are unhappy.

8. Stesichorus was blinded for his impiety in writing an unflattering poem about Helen of Troy. The real target of Plato is Homer (who was said to have been blind), whom Plato believes has miseducated everyone, including the lyric poets. Stesichorus atoned by writing an encomium to Helen and his sight is restored.

9. Maybe this is related to the symbolism of the cloak over Socrates’ head. He has been, in effect, blind and therefore his speech about love has not been one of true knowledge. But by removing his cloak (having his vision restored, like Stesichorus) he is now ready to give us this true knowledge. Lovely metaphors Plato ole’ buddy!

C. Socrates decides to start again: “The essence of good speech is telling the truth.” That is why his first speech failed, because it accepted some of Lysias’ values and assumptions, and therefore was not true.

1. Socrates admits that love is madness or a type of insanity. But not all insanity is evil.

2. There are four kinds of “insanity” that are good, endowed by the gods: prophecy, purgation or atonement for sins, lyric poetry, and love.

3. Socrates third speech is actually all of these things, the “great instantiation” of love in a kind of divine or superhuman sense.

4. If we want to characterize these speeches metallurgically, Lysias’ speech as a “bronze” speech; Socrates’ first speech as a “silver” speech; and his third and final encomium is a “gold” speech.

D. Socrates give us an image of the soul in love. He uses the metaphor of a winged chariot, driven by charioteer and pulled by two horses. This chariot takes us up out of the realm of space and time to the home of the gods and the realm of the forms.

1. Most humans have a white horse (docile and good) and a black one (hard to handle, bad). The problem is to get the black horse of the soul under control.

2. Only in this way can we “stand on the back of the universe” to see reality and live with the gods for the 10,000 year cycle of the cosmos.

3. If we do not control the “black” horse, we suffer the human condition of living in the world of substance, longing for the beautiful realm of the forms.

4. Love reminds us of the beauty of what our souls once knew in an earlier existence – if you’re familiar with Plato’s conception of the “Transmigration of the Soul” (described here), then you’re on the right track. – maybe. . .

5. Real love is thus an attempt to improve the other by improving their soul. This is what Socrates is trying to do for Phaedrus.

6. Plato believed in a cycle of life, judgment and rebirth in one thousand year cycles (within the larger 10,000 year cosmic cycle). If, after 10,000 years, you are virtuous, you “get your wings” and live with the gods. However, if you are like Socrates, practicing this kind of (“Platonic”) love, you need only go around three times. Convenient!

E. Socrates lets us know that sex is to the body what good, improving speech is to the soul. This is unselfish, divine

love. This is the true speech about love, which Socrates is delivering with the cloak off his head, symbolizing light

in truth.

1. At this point, after a religious speech about love, Socrates begins to talk about rhetoric, and a definition of the “good” speech. In this case, he accuses the Sophists as the seducers of the demos/polis.  Their motives are suspect because they want to gratify themselves, not improve the demos.

2. Socrates wants to persuade people and society for their own benefit. Knowledge is the essence of a good speech.

3. A speech must move towards dialectic. Some rhetoric is acceptable, but Socrates’ rhetoric is different (more orderly) than that of the Sophists.

4. Socrates then gives a whole catalogue of opposites, which express what the soul is, and what our identity is. We are seen and known in our speech.

5. Again, we see that Socrates is divinely inspired (dithyrambic), undergoing a purgation, using lyric poetry, and expressing his love for Phaedrus.

F. At the end of this “hymn to love”, the sun is setting.  This spreading darkness is a return from passion to reason and logic.  Socrates now moves to philosophy to finish the “journey” of the dialogue as they return to the city.

1. Socrates suggests a prayer, demonstrating the importance of piety as a bridge to the gods.

2. The concluding idea is that the love reaches into the soul and makes it divine. This happens only in the presence of another soul, which we can love. Love is the gift of the gods.

OK, so there’s the general structure of Plato’s argument before the section on speech/rhetoric and writing.  Now let’s try to see how exactly Phaedrus engages the role of public and private life of the Athenian citizen and the relationship between individuality versus collectivity in this piece. . .

  • Early on in this piece we get a social/urban rural/individual divide – Socrates resides in the grove seeking truth and Lysias (the Sophist) is in the city, practicing his Gorgianic art.  Here also the binary between nature/society is already becoming apparent.  Nature=truth or inartistic proofs, society=artistic proofs.
  • You “learn” things in the city from people. . . which sounds noble; however, if we take Plato’s other writings into account, “learning” isn’t nearly as valuable as looking inward and discovering truth.  Pg. 115, 1st column.
  • Lysias’ speech seems to argue that it is better to give your affection to a non-lover because they are more likely to be able to return that affection in kind.  ‘
  • Socrates’ first speech makes the argument that the lover will do what he needs to do to turn the loved into something the lover wants, not what is best for the lover.  This too is a mistake because it is woefully self-indulgent and doesn’t exhibit a concern for the loved best interest.  If we extend this metaphor to rhetoric and the role of the rhetor in public life, it would appear that Socrates – in his first speech – is arguing that the rhetor can take his “lover” or audience for a ride without care of repercussion toward self interested motives; however, he recants this position after his daimon pays him a visit and lets him know that he has offended the gods by assigning “love” – a deity – an essentially negative quality.  In response, Socrates reconceptualizes his notion of “love” and how to deal with it.
  • On the immortality of the soul:  so, that which is moved from the outside is soulless.  Extending this line of reasoning to truth, that soul resides in truth. . . or actually the truth resides in the soul.  That truth, found inside the soul, should instantiate the Beginning of movement.  If moved from outside (through the artistic proofs that rhetoric provides), then the movement – the logos – is artificial and non-truthful, or at least not commensurate with the soul.
  • In his second speech, Socrates corrects both Lysias and his first speech by recognizing that the good lover will only care for his beloved – even to the point of losing all of those things that Lysias claimed he would cut off from his beloved in his speech.  Extending this further, the lover of discourse and speech would do well to heed Socrates’ call for the interest of the larger beloved – the polis/demos.  126
  • We get the indictment of sophistical rhetoric on 131, 1st column.
  • Socrates grounds rhetorical practice as an art that leads the soul with words both inside and outside of public life.  He notes, “Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an art which leads the soul by means of words, not only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as well?”  Further, Socractes notes that the “art of contention in speech is not confined to courts and political gatherings, but apparently, if it is an art at all, it would be one and the same in all kinds of speaking, the art by which man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things between which it can be produced, and to bring to light the resemblances produced and disguised by anyone else.” (132)  In both these sentences, Socrates is grounding rhetoric in a public and private context – or perhaps neither of these contexts exists and rhetoric simply is a state of being.
  • When epistemology, Socrates relies on dialectic to produce meaning (135).  As such, sophistical rhetoric is merely a precursor to the real work of dialectical reasoning because it relies on formulas and manipulation rather than a process of arriving at truth (137, 1st).
  • Socrates lays out the perfect rhetorician on 138, 2nd column.  He must know the class of speech, the kairotic moment, his audience (and the practical application of a class of speech to that audience) and the proper delivery.
  • For public deliberative speech, probability is king; therefore, sophism will reign because the need for truth is not as persuasive as the need for likelihood.
  • The need to speak – according to the Sophists – is a distinctly public activity; however, the need for reasoning and good speech is – according to Socrates – pleasing to the Gods and therefore necessary in all aspects of life (139).
  • The end of Phaedrus serves as an invective against writing because it serves as an artificial wisdom that stands in contradiction to dialectic – it also cannot speak for itself, another strike against being dialectical.  True to form, Socrates never wrote anything.
  • Much is made of Socrates’ negative perception of Athenian law courts at the end of Phaedrus.
  • Diverging from his pretty harsh treatment of the Sophists in Gorgias, Socrates treats rhetoric with a lot more respect in Phaedrus.  He concludes that rhetoric is a neutral art in this piece.  Ideally, he only wants it to be put to use by the philosopher.
  • Everett Lee Hunt argues that Aristotle’s Rhetoric is an extended version of Phaedrus.  Specifically, he sets up the following principles:
    • Disgrace lies in speaking badly, not in the act of speaking itself.
    • Knowledge on the subject matter is essential to the speaker.
    • Rhetoric is most useful in doubtful matters, where the outcome is unclear.
    • The true art depends on:
      • A speaker’s knowledge of nature
      • The speaker’s knowledge of the soul
        • The genus and species of souls
        • How the soul acts or is acted upon
        • How causes affect the soul
      • The speaker’s ability to enchant the soul
    • A discourse has a bodily structure, and therefore, has parts (proem, narrative, testimony, evidence, probabilities, and recapitulation).
    • Rhetoric is a difficult art, but worth practicing. (qtd. In Murphy and Katula 25-6)
  • I think that Plato is basically saying in this piece that rhetoric is useful – in fact, it’s utility lies in its neutral art and its status as a way to encourage dialectical engagement across disparate discourses in civil society.  Unfortunately, this principle doesn’t seem to be extendable beyond the dialectical encounter of the individual to a larger polis/demos wide conversation. . . when it gets that broad there are too many voices and it devolves to simple sophism.

Selections from On Rhetoric – Aristotle

  • Again, this is an iconic text, so I don’t think I’ll be doing a summation on the piece as a whole; rather, I’m reading here for how Aristotle engages the public and private in his discussion.
  • Aristotle agrees with Plato – and also Socrates – on the point that rhetoric is an art.  He notes that ordinary people do it – this seems to suggest that rhetoric is a popular enterprise; however, as the first line points out, you can’t have rhetoric without dialectic. . . so it must happen with the help of another.
  • Aristotle also notes the tension between truth and probabilities.  Though not as harsh as Plato, he acknowledges that those who are able to consistently guess the truth can also guess the probabilities.  So, in a sense, he short-circuits Plato’s idea that those who trade in probabilities are poorly intentioned rhetoricians.
  • Aristotle hints at man as discourse creating creature when he discusses the role of words vs. the role of the “limbs.”  Civilized men use words to demonstrate their arguments, not violence/force.
  • Because rhetoric is an art unconcerned with one particular class of subjects, but the use of persuasion in discoursing on all subjects, it’s utility is universal and its practice is ubiquitous.
  • Interestingly, Aristotle notes how rhetoric is persuasive because there is somebody whom it persuades. . . this again is the constitution of an “other” whereas Plato’s truth – the reason anyone should persuade – is a solely individual journey of self-discovery.  Though Aristotle isn’t necessarily changing the notion of rhetoric all that much from Socrates’ definitions in Phaedrus, he is situating it in a dialogic context – not a lone search in the soul for “truth.”
  • A. notes how of the three elements in speech-making, the person addressed (audience) is what determines any speech.  As such, rhetoric is again perceived in this context as a public enterprise that is especially in tune with the audience (as opposed to lyric poetry perhaps).
  • In his section on anger (book 2, chapter 2), we see another discussion of the applicability of rhetoric/dialectic to discourse between a small number of interlocutors; however, as A. notes in this section, it is rare that an emotion can be felt toward “man” in general.  This might again point to the notion of the “mob” or the “public” as a dangerous, easily swayed multitude of non-philosopher kings unable to make smart decisions for themselves (and hence, dangerous!). . . just a hypothesis.

Cicero – excerpts from De Inventione

  • Cicero wonders early whether men and communities have received more good or evil from oratory or a devotion to eloquence.  So, here we see rhetoric grounding in the fore of a concern for the community.
  • Cicero too believes that eloquence (rhetoric) needs to be supplemented with wisdom in order to be in the interest of states.
  • Rhetoric is perceived as a way to argue for the welfare of your country in this piece.
  • Cicero notes – much like Aristotle’s conversation about the use of “limbs” as opposed to rhetoric – that man at one time resorted to brute force to sort things out; however, language and eloquence became a civilizing (perhaps the civilizing) force in man’s existence.
  • We find this process of civilizing constituting a functioning public community by codifying law, justice and the common good through persuasive discourse.
  • Cicero attaches governances of states to the art of eloquence – he seems to also draw the development of class to this same practice (9).
  • Cicero makes a distinction between public and private affairs on 11.  First time.
  • An echo of Aristotle’s metaphor for proper rhetorical practice vis-à-vis the role of medicine is echoes in Cicero.  He notes that “we say that the function of the physician is to treat the patient in a manner suited to heal him, the end is to heal him by treatment.”  Likewise, the function of eloquence seems to be in a manner suited to persuade an audience, the end is to persuade by speech” (15).

Cicero – excerpts from De Officiis

  • Early on, Cicero offers proscriptions for young and old alike on how to spend their public time in the service of friends, each other, and most of all the state.  The young should labor physically while the older should labor mentally.  No one is urged to remain in a state of leisure.  A contradiction with Plato?
  • For the public (magistrate), he should bear in mind that “he represents the state and that it is his duty to uphold its honour and its dignity, to enforce the law, to dispense to all their constitutional rights” whereas the private citizen should “live on fair and equal terms with his fellow citizens, with a spirit neither servile or groveling nor yet domineering” . . . and he should work toward the good of the state.
  • The non-citizen shouldn’t meddle in the Roman public. . . it’s not their business (127).
  • The view of “Nature’s demands” here has changed a bit perhaps from the Greeks.  According to Cicero, the performance of these functions is nothing immoral; however, speaking about them in public is a problem. . . so we have our first reading that confronts issues of censorship.
  • An interesting construction of Nature as a proprietous entity concerned with modesty.
  • The public appearance – adornment, physical stature and dignity – are essential for the outward visible propriety of the Ciceronian public figure.  Interestingly, Cicero usually persuades toward the middle road in his recommendations of public presentation – not too boorish/crass and not too flamboyant/extreme.
  • The distinction between oratory and conversation is a distinction between public and private speech.
  • In the section “The Proper Home” we get a peek into what sort of private life Cicero advocates in his writing.  We get directives about how not to be the nuveau riche, and how a homeowner should bring honor on his house, not the converse.
  • For Cicero, the most important lesson is to keep impulse subservient to reason.
  • Though likely obvious, Cicero classes and renders silent the lower in his section on vulgarity and being liberal (153-5).

Cicero – excerpts from De Oratore

  • Cicero believes eloquence comes from the “accomplishments of learned men” whereas his friend believes it’s a skill attributable to a kind of talent and practice.
  • Historically, Romans have sought after eloquence in order to be good citizens (4).
  • Assembly speech is considered first in this emulation of Phaedrus.  The distinction between man and beast rooted in the art of speech is noted on 7L.  This is almost verbatim from Aristotle’s section on men and beasts and the difference between the two.
  • The art of eloquence is certainly an organ of the state to prevent conflict in this piece.  (15).
  • Wisdom and truth make the orator – not mere ornamentation (17).
  • A marriage between truthful speech (philosophy) and eloquent speech (rhetoric/oratory) is the ideal public speaker for Cicero (18).
  • A comment on ornamentation without matter )sophism) at the top of 19.
  • The proper concern of an orator is “language of power and elegance accommodated to the feeling and understandings of mankind” (20).  This view of the rhetor certainly has an obligation toward the public.
  • The difference between speakers in this piece is two:  Crassus feels like rhetoric is what founded the state and what makes the state glorious.  S. feels that the state was founded on good laws and good decision making.  For S. oratory needs to stay in the courts, assemblies and public life – not the conversational private life of this fantastic Italian villa! (Sections 8 – 12)
    • Crassus states that oratory is one of the greatest accomplishments that a nation can have.
      He extols the power that oratory can give to a person- including the ability to maintain civil rights, words to defend oneself, and the ability to revenge oneself on a wicked person.
      The ability to converse is what gives mankind our advantage over other animals and nature. It is what creates civilization. Since speech is so important, why should we not use it to the benefit of oneself, other individuals, and even the entire State?
    • Scaevola agrees with Crassus’s points except for two.
      Scaevola does not feel that orators are what created social communities and he questions the superiority of the orator if there were no assemblies, courts, etc.
      It was good decision making and laws that formed society, not eloquence. Was Romulus an orator? Scaevola says that there are more examples of damage done by orators than good, and he could cite many instances.
      There are other factors of civilization that are more important than orator: ancient ordinances, traditions, augury, religious rites and laws, private individual laws.
      Had Scaevola not been in Crassus’s domain, Scaevola would take Crassus to court and argue over his assertions, a place where oratory belongs.
      Courts, assemblies and the Senate are where oratory should remain, and Crassus should not extend the scope of oratory beyond these places. That is too sweeping for the profession of oratory.
    • Crassus replies that he has heard Scaevola’s views before, in many works including Plato ’s Gorgias. However, he does not agree with their viewpoint. In respects to Gorgias, Crassus reminds that, while Plato was making fun of orators, Plato himself was the ultimate orator. If the orator was nothing more than a speaker without the knowledge of oratory, how is it possible that the most revered people are skilled orators? The best speakers are those who have a certain “style”, which is lost, if the speaker does not comprehend the subject matter on which he is speaking.
  • Antonius notes that the education that Crassus describes in the ideal orator is really difficult to discover because it’s a sort of polymathism. . .

Cape “Roman Women in the History of Rhetoric and Oratory”

  • The beginning of this article addresses the reclamation of female Greek rhetoricians; however, it also acknowledges the difficulty in accepting the source materials from which revisionist histories of Arete, Aspasia, Diotima and other Greek female rhetoricians.
  • The difficulty of recovering Greek women’s texts is their position as private individuals due to their exclusion from the public sphere of Greek life.
  • Opportunities for participation in public life were open to Greek women of noble birth.
  • Eloquence allowed for the feminine whereas classical Greek rhetorike did not.
  • The Roman understanding of eloquence seemed to rely far more heavily on a kairotic quality.  As Cape notes, “Cato does not say dicendi doctus (“educated in speaking”) but rather peritus (“skilled through practical application and the observance of when to use proper elements at the proper time”)
  • Women’s oratory is taken up by Cicero when he discusses the influence of a mother’s/women’s voice on a son’s speech.  Women’s speech is sermo or private conversation.  It is gained through exposure when the mother is a youth to an eloquent father/male figure.
  • Private women’s speech: Sermo.  The rhetoric of sermo is closely tied with the concurrent development of letter writing or epistolae.  Interestingly, the rhetorical conventions of private speech carries over to the private messages between individuals.  This is in some tension or contradiction with dialectic and how rhetoric has been conceptualized unto this time: a two-or-more (but not too many!) person enterprise.
  • To participate in the private genre of sermo – despite it’s being private – it is essential to sound as though you are a man. . . or at least to observe the same rhetorical conventions (120).
  • The author notes that in this essay “part of my argument is that Roman rhetoric opens up a conceptual space in which women’s rhetoric has a part.  Further research on sermo as feminine speech would help us understand the limitations and opportunities of this expression.  The connection between women’s conversation and the epistolary genre suggests a link to the origin and development of women’s letter-writing practice and instruction in the West” (125).

[1] Let me say that this piece has been worked over by about a million people – so when I don’t do justice here, I’m not trying. . . I’m reading a particular way for particular content. In this particular case, I’m reading Phaedrus to look for how rhetoric intervenes or is participatory in the formation of public and private life.  J

Sep 18th 09 Posted by justin in CCR691

CCR691 – Week Four – Rhetorical Analysis

Richard Leo Enos

Rhetoric Review, Vol. 25. No. 4, 357-87

This piece is a collection of reflections by noted rhetoric scholars on the development of rhetorical analysis.  In the general sense, most of the writers situate their understanding of the genesis of the field in terms of the following authors:  Wichelns, Black, Bitzer, and the explosion of authors during the social reclamation efforts of the 80s and 90s.  To move forward, I’ll highlight the speaker and key points from each.

1.   Richard Enos:

a.  the study of discourse in the social context is the greatest achievement of rhetorical criticism.

b.  early 20th century conceptions of rhetoric excluded anything that wasn’t “nonmimetic, civic discourse that was agonistically performed before immediate audiences” (362).

c.  New methods of rhetorical analysis developed as the “province of historical rhetoric dilated to include other types of expression” – namely women’s, A.A., etc.

2.  Karlyn Kohrs Campbell:

a.  Barriers to rhetorical criticism: it’s conceived in Aristotelian and Ciceronian terms.

b.  Cross cultural use of these elements of rhetorical criticism:  credibility

c.  Principles of rhetoric: a)rhetoric is ubiquitous, b)rhetoric is indigenous – linked to cultural         histories, values and traditions, c)rhetoric is the study of language.

3.  Andrew King:

a.  The revival of rhetoric as a study of inquiry was the result of the revival of civic infrastructure in the early 20th century and was brought to full bloom by the Progressive era.

4.  Celeste Condit:

a.  Adoption of “empathy studies” as research method.  Empathy studies asks that the researcher “begins with a modicum of openness and uncertainty and simply tries to lend as empathetic an ear as s/he possibly can to multiple voices.  The goal is not to promote one “side” of the discourse over the other, nor to synthesize, though either of those may sometimes be the product.  The goal is to construct discourses on can best embody (whether at the social or individual scale)” (370).

b.  This listening process will reveal sites of rhetorical investigation that aren’t oratory – namely bodies and the “broader ecologies in which we swim” (370).

5.  Richard Jensen

a.  Social movement rhetoric began to develop as a response to the inadequacies of neo-Aristotelian methods to account for the irrational aspect of protest rhetorics of the 1960s.

b.  Bowers and Ochs “The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control”

c.  Jensen asks that rhetorical critics of the 21st century “combine current theories of rhetoric with traditional theories used in previous movement studies to explain how new technologies. . . have impacted the role of leaders and the organization of movements” (374).

6.  Sonja Foss

a.  Agency as Rhetorical Criticism

i.  Step One – Select an artifact.

ii.  Step Two – Choose how to analyze or interpret the artifact.  You can choose a scripted interpretation and apply it to an artifact to see if it works, or you can use an artifact from which you will draw interpretations.

iii.  Step Three – Sharing criticism – Share your work with others and see what sorts of other interpretations develop.

7.  Martin Medhurst

a.  Defines rhetoric as “a mode of thinking, doing, and ultimately, being.  Rhetoric is a mode of analytical thinking that helps the critic ask important questions and explore significant dimensions of public culture” (381).

8.  David Zarefsky

a.  Developing the idea that “method” could/should be substituted with “attitude”

b.  Suggests using two questions to enact this ‘tude: 1)What’s going on here, and 2) What about it?

c.  Suggests revisioning the artifact of the rhetorical analysis not as text, but as object.

9.  Jennifer DeWinter

a.  Context is key to rhetorical analysis – not just “criticism.”

b.  Some rhetorical criticism methodologies:

i.  etic methodology – “In the etic approach, the critic is concerned with generalized statements about rhetoric that are derived from well-defined methodological procedures” (392)

ii.  emic methodology – “The emic approach, on the other hand, is completely situated within one rhetorical situation as it is contextualized in culture and history, thus the observations or patterns described can only be valid in relation to that one particular setting and cannot be described by a generalized theory that is imposed on a particular rhetorical situation” (392).

c.  Recommendation of longitudinal studies  -  uses Darwin’s evolutionary writings as an example of how rhetoric is longitudinal.

d.  Rhetorical criticism, regardless of method, should serve a purpose.

Selzer, Jack.  “Rhetorical Analysis:  Understanding How Texts Persuade Readers” in Bazerman, Charles, and Paul A. Prior, eds. What Writing Does and How It Does It: An Introduction to Analyzing Texts and Textual Practices. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004.

I thought, to some degree, that I practiced rhetorical analysis when writing.  This chapter confirmed that knowledge.  Selzer breaks up rhetorical analysis into two camps: contextual analysis and textual analysis.  Though at the end of the chapter Selzer recommends NOT separating the two forms of analysis, in his guide to rhetorical analysis he does so for illustrative purposes.

For both forms of analysis (but especially for textual analysis) Selzer relies heavily on ancient rhetorical vocabulary/method.  He recommends using/considering:

a.  types of rhetoric (deliberative, forensic, epideictic)

b.  cannons of rhetoric (inventio, dispostio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio)

c.  appeals (ethos, pathos, logos)

d.  dispostio’s components (exordium, narratio, confimatio, refutatio, peroration)

Foss, Sonja. Rhetorical Criticism:  Exploration and Practice. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1989.

In Chapter Two of this oldie-but-goodie, Foss lays out a very programmatic way to conduct rhetorical analysis.  I’m going to use a lot of bullet points here:

a.  The Overall Method

  • i.  Discovery of the Rhetorical Artifact and Research Question
  • ii.  Formulation of the Critical Method
  • iii.  Critical Analysis of Artifact
  • iv.  Writing the Critical Essay

Discovering the rhetorical artifact and research question

  • a.  artifact and question simultaneously as impetus
  • b.  question as impetus
  • c.  artifact as useful

b.  Discovering the research question

  • a.  random stimulation (hokey?)
  • b.  alternative perspectives (see artifact from other perspectives)

i.  perspective as particle (constituent parts)

ii.  perspective as wave (how does artifact work with spatiotemporal change?)

iii.  perspective as field (how does artifact function in field?)

  • c.  topics

i.  definition

ii.  comparison and contrast

iii.  cause and effect

  • d.  reversal (pursue opposite direction/understanding)
  • e.  asking ‘why?’
  • f.  choice of entry point

Formulation of the Critical Method

  • a.  Use existing methods
  • b.  Create a method from an existing concept (what I usually do!)
  • c.  create new method

Content of Analysis

  • a.  introduction
  • b.  description of artifact
  • c.  description of critical method
  • d.  report of findings of the analysis
  • e.  interpretation
  • f.  evaluation of findings
  • g.  contribution to rhetorical theory (did you revise the field as a result of findings)

Stance or “How I learned to deal with socially constructed realities”

  • a.  Argumentation (detailed, reliable description)
  • b.  Coherence (is it understandable for your reader?)
  • c.  Acknowledgement of subjectivity
  • d.  presentation of choice

After giving us the low down on the method of “doing” rhetorical criticism, a lovely essay follows that describes E.T. as the embodiment of mythic transcendence in the face of postmodernity.

Rhetorical Analysis – Fahnestock and Secor

A nice definition of rhetorical analysis is provided at the beginning of this chapter.  F&S note, “Because it is based on a view of language as a medium of communication and not a system of representation, it assumes that speakers and writers have intentions or designs on readers and hearers, and it seeks to identify the verbal means typically used to achieve those intentions or designs” (177).  F&S go on to recognize that NO language exists without purpose and as such, there are no “innocent exchanges” in language.

After recapping the ancient rhetoricians that were covered adequately by Selzer in the Bazerman piece, F&S take up some Roman tenants of rhetoric.  They illustrate the stases – or the ancient taxonomy of issues (fact, definition or quality/value) as well as taking up the topoi or Aristotle.  They also address the notions of high, middle and low style.  Making mention of Burke and the “New Rhetoric” of Olbrechts-Tyteca and Perelman, F&S recommend the following four basic characteristics of rhetorical analysis:

a.  Rhetorical analysis pays attention to the who, when, where, and probably why of a text

b.  Rhetorical analysis uses an identifiable vocabulary drawn from the rhetorical tradition and/or from a particular school or theorist

c.  Rhetorical analysis identifies language choices that serve the rhetor’s ostensible purpose, or perhaps, depending on the interpreter, his or her unconscious or subverted purposes

d.  Rhetorical analysis seeks to uncover the argument of a text.

After concluding an example analysis of a piece by Stanley Fish, F&S recognize the rich history of “discourse analysis” on the sentence and word level; however, they make sure to note the subjective/invested nature of the researcher in that endeavor.

Sep 10th 09 Posted by justin in CCR601, composition

CCR601 – Week Three

Pough, Gwendolyn D.  “’Each One, Pull One’ : Womanist Rhetoric and Black Feminist Pedagogy in the Writing Classroom.” Teaching Rhetorica: Theory, Pedagogy, Practice.  Eds. Kate Ronald and Joy Ritchie. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook, 2006.

Executive Summary:
In this piece, Pough discusses how Womanist ideology can inform Black Feminist Pedagogy in the writing classroom.  Through an analysis of her own experience as a writing teacher using Womanist/Black Feminist texts, Pough examines the tensions toward Womanist and Black Feminist writers that arise in white-dominated  post-secondary classrooms .  She concludes that by utilizing the parrhesian qualities of  Womanist rhetoric to inform Black feminist pedagogy in the composition classroom, instructors are able to “help students move past and ‘transgress’ their own boundaries” toward a social justice of inclusion (81).

Influences:
bell hooks
Alice Walker
Cheryl Johnson and Shirley Wilson Logan

Quotable Quotes:
“I maintain that the writings of black feminist educators and womanist rhetoricians can offer examples of praxis that cen help us make the writing classroom a space in which critical thinking around diverse issues can ultimately lead to change” (70).

Emergent Strategies for an Established Field : The Role of Worker-Writer Collectives in Composition and Rhetoric
Steve Parks and Nick Pollard

Executive Summary:
While teaching a class dedicated to exploring working-class literacies at a elite University in the US, Parks recognized that most of his students couldn’t identify with working-class discourse; furthermore, their inability to identify caused a marginalization of the few working-class students present.  In response, Parks helped establish working-class literacy initiatives that utilized service-learning and community literacy practices via writers groups and blogs in order to create a federation of writers dedicated to forging new communities rooted in working-class existence.  In making his argument, Parks urges a reconception of contact-zone pedagogy to federation-based community literacy.

Influences:
De Certeau
Mary Louise Pratt
Ira Shor
Paulo Freire

Quotable Quotes:

“Civic writing. . . would be structured to allow these different populations – the FWWCP, Basement Writers, and SU students – to discuss connections between education and economic class, developing the issue within the contexts of access, disablity, equity, and curriculum.”

“These courses attracted a strong contingent of working-class students who found in the manifesto and community partnerships that grounded the class discussion a tradition of work which enabled them to not only speak, but to use their own experience and skills to interrupt the dominant discourses of privilege in many of their classes and draw in their own experiences as bases of legitimate knowledge production.”

Agnew, Lois. (2009). Teaching propriety: Unlocking the mysteries of ‘political correctness’.  College Composition and Communication 60.4. 746-764.

Executive Summary:

In this article, Agnew argues that a “new pedagogical construction of rhetorical appropriateness” could stem the complaints of students that they are “stifled by ‘political correctness’” in composition classrooms (761).  In forging this new pedagogical construction, Agnew recommends a reclamation of the 18th century concepts of propriety and taste.  In rejecting the 19th century conception of propriety/taste as an “isolated realm of aesthetic experience”, Agnew argues that writing teachers should seriously consider the 18th century formulations of these terms as rooted in “a social capacity developed through critical discussion and rhetorical training that considers issues of audience and context” (756).  As a sister to the Greek concept of kairos, 18th century scholar Hugh Blair’s definition of propriety and taste create ways to link style to communicative goals and social situations (754).  In considering 18th century definitions of taste and propriety in the writing classroom, composition teachers sidestep silencing “entitled to my opinion” approaches while encouraging students to employ taste/propriety in order to develop “ethical subjectivity” while still engendering a respect for the “shared social decisions about appropriate language” (761).

Influences:

Hugh Blair

Sharon Crowley

John Poulakos

Isocrates/Cicero

Quotable Quotes:

“Such an effort [teaching taste and propriety] might help students recognize that appropriate language does not have to be externally imposed, concieved of as a punishment that destroys their rhetorical intentions, but instead can provide them with the flexisbility they need in order to achieve true rhetorical agency” (749).

“He [Blair] shares with both classical and contemporary theorists the assumption that rhetors who cultivate skills he strives to teach will ultimately embody the ethical sense that accompanies propriety, which becomes rhetorically constructed as discourse that is responsive to audience” (755).

“While advocating that individuals yield to the ill-defined ‘common feelings of men’ unquestionably holds the danger of a powerful collective imposing its standards on powerless individuals, the current state of public discourse suggests that we have swung too far in the direction of abandoning individuals to their independent assesments of what constitutes appropriate discourse, since such judgements often rely upon a determination to exert autonomous choice without regard for social consequences” (756).

Writing From Souces, Writing From Sentences – Rebecca Moore Howard

Executive Summary:

In this piece, student writing is analyzed with an eye toward the kinds of source integration students do when composing essays.  In the analysis, the researchers viewed student source integration with an eye toward summary, patchwriting, paraphrasing, and direct copying.  The researchers found that student often patchwrote, paraphrased and copied; however, they didn’t often use summary.  This discovery led the researcher to ask whether the students actually were working with the sources, or merely sentences in the sources.  In fact, “Plagiarism is difficult to avoid if one is constructing an argument from isolated sentences pulled from sources” (15).

Influences:

Rebecca Moore Howard

Pecorari

Quotable Quotes:

“Our observations also raise questions about problems students may have with source-based writing, problems that are both prior to and foundational to their correct citation of sources.  Citation counts for little if what is being cited is a fragmentary representation of the source.  Plagiarism is difficult to avoid if one is constructing an argument from isolated sentences pulled from sources” (15).

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