Nov 9th 09 Posted by justin in CCR601

CCR601 – R&P 42.3

Bayer, Thora I. “Hegelian Rhetoric.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 42.3 (2009): 203-19. Print

• Rhetoric is an antistrophe to dialectic (antistrophe is the “turning back” of the chorous on the audience in the traditional ancient Greek play).
• Kant considered dialectic the “logic of illusion” that occurs when reason takes its powers beyond experience to make claims concerning the nature of the soul, world, and God (203).
• Kant is responsible for banishing rhetoric from “philosophical idealism”
• The author wants to answer two questions:
  • How does Hegel’s Phenomenology of the Spirit embody a transformation of the Aristotelian conception of rhetoric as an antistrophes to dialectic?
  • How does the Hegelian connection of dialectic to rhetoric suggest a sense of the sublime? (204)
  • Hegel wants philosophy to not be a “critical reflection” ; rather, he wishes to return it to its ancient function as “speculation” (207).
  • The Phenomenology of the Spirit is an “account of the systematic development of the self itself and has been rightly called a philosophical Bildungsroman” (207).
  • Hegel’s philosophy – because it’s speculation – is an intellectual and spiritual adventure.
  • Hegel gets beyond the “thing-in-itself” or “in-itself” problem by applying dialectic to experience.  In other words, Hegel makes experience dialectical. To do this, he replaces “the reflective sentence, which affirms and denies connections between classes of objects, with the speculative sentence” (209).
  • Reason is the inner life of experience.
  • The double Anisch – ok, what an interesting concept.  This is the idea that when we come across an object we are:
    • First aware of the object
    • Second aware of our awareness of the object
    • When we move from the 2^nd awareness back to the 1^st awareness, the 1^st awareness becomes a new in-itself.  During this process, bits of the original in-itself are preserved and transformed in their new actuality.
    • This system of opinions – progression of opinions – is the system of human experience itself (211).
    • Hegel’s rhetoric in the Phenomenology is a counterpart to his dialectic.  None of his claims – according t the author – are achieved by philosophical proofs; rather, the “reader is drawn into the movement of consciousness itself” (216).

Loehing, Melanie, and Jeff Motter. “Publics, Counterpublics, and the Promise of Democracy.”  Philosophy and Rhetoric 42.3 (2009): 220-41. Print.

• This article seeks to look at both Habermas and Fraser again in order to revisit the “original point of theoretical contention in an effort to specify the different normative commitments of the two perspectives and reevaluate the role each envisions for rhetoric as a potentially democratic praxis” (220).
• Robert Asen and Daniel Brouwer have addressed the public sphere and counterpublic sphere in rhetorical scholarship.  Check out their work
• The differences between the two:
  • Frasers scholarship asks how existing and future publics can be treated democratically
  • Habermas’ scholarship inquires into the means by which publics create democracy
  • The authors will compare the two to try and determine what the two authors envision as the role for rhetoric in their conceptions of the public sphere.
  • Fraser’s articulation of the public sphere includes:
    • Subaltern counterpublics – the “parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs” (223)
    • She finds that Habermas’ public sphere doesn’t account for the social inequality of different interlocutors in the public sphere.
    • She demonstrates how many counterpublics were existent in the same period that Habermas demonstrates his public sphere to highlight the exclusions occurring in burgeois public sphere formation.
    • The excluded included “race gender, and class identities”
    • The multiplicity of publics highlights the “contestatory relationship” between counterpublics and a dominant public
    • The idea of an a priori “common good” is impossible in the universal public sphere because of loads of folks that are marginalized.
    • Habermas’ articulation is also deficient for Fraser because it presumes that there is a false separation between civil society (for her, the public sphere) and the state – on other words, the bourgeois public are not state officials.  But this isn’t the case.  Hence, the “public opinion” generated by the bourgeois public is not actually capable of being independent of the state’s influence.  Hence, it constitutes a “weak public.”
    • For Fraser, a “postbourgeois” conception of the public sphere to attend to the democratically deficient version of the public sphere pushed by Habermas.
    • Habermas’ conception of the public sphere for the authors of this article is not a celebration of one historical example, but actually “an argument on behalf of transformed publicity as a key force in the reinvention of political power” (224).
      • Habermas focuses on shifts in the “public” in three eras: feudal, capitalism, and social-welfare democracy
      • Public authority is highlighted for each era (224-5)
      • For feudalism, publicity was representative in the person of power (nobility)
      • In early capitalism the representative of power was forced to submit – at least in some degree – to the “public opinion” through the salons and coffeehouses of the 17^th, 18^th, and 19^th century.
      • The social welfare democracy era is marked by something of a return to feudalistic systems of representation.  “The public sphere becomes the court before whose public prestige can be discplayed – rather than in which public critical debate is carried on”
      • Counterpublic studies “focuses on inclusion in order to promotea  kind of equality that illuminates ‘questions of fairness and justice’ in an actually existing democracy” (228)
      • “Counterpublic signifies the collectives that emerge in recognition of various exclusions from wider publics of potential participants, discourse topics, and speaking styles and the resolve that builds to overcome these exclusions” (228).
      • Counterpublic studies marks power as the key means by which exclusions from political participation are maintained
      • See Habermas’ critique of Fraser on 228-9
      • There are two forms of power circulating int his article:
        • Extra-rhetorical power – singular in nature and shifts only to the extent that it is exercised by different groups
        • Rhetorically constituted power – exists by virtue of the critical publicity issuing from functioning public spheres – this form of power is multiple an doften incompativble, but it arises and is continually challenged and reinvented as the product of citizens’ rhetorical engagement in public (230)
          • Democracy means two different things for Habermasian and counterpublic sphere theory:
            • Habermasian perspective understands democracy to thrive as the ongoing constitution of democratic culture from public spheres’ rational-critical debate
            • Counterpublic studies views democracy both as the setting in which counterpublics operate and at the level of optimally universal access to participation (democratic treatment of publics) (231).
            1. The final change in the public sphere that Habermas articulates is a threatening force of neoliberal market infiltration of the democratic public sphere (231-2)
            2. Habermas’ theory – according to the authors – is more suited for questions about how to better create democracy as a result of civic (rhetorical) action instead of how to include excluded groups in the (for Habermas now dead or dying) democratic process.
            3. If counterpublic sphere theory comes to dominate, the authors are worried that “turning the question of power into the achievement of political interests shifts our attention from democracy as a practice of political contestation to the very aggregative politics Habermas opposes in refeudalization” (234).
            4. Get a copy of “Between Facts and Norms” by Habermas

Rubini, Rocco. “Humanism as Philosophia (Perennis): Grassi’s Platonic Rhetoric between Gadamer and Kristeller.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 42.3:  242-78.  Print.

• The essay “closely narrates how Grassi’s notions of metaphysics and “rhetoric” developed in his early writings in order to dispel some of the misconceptions that have prevented readers from entering what Grassi himself defines as the “originary tension” awakening his own, and, indeed, any philosopher’s interests and pathos” (243).
• A lot of “schools of thought” discussed in this article.  Heideggarian, Tubingen, Gadamerian, Aristotelian, etc.
• Grassi starts as a Christian, encounters Heidegger then moves on to humanism.
• Grassi’s encounter with Heidegger’s Daesin changes his life.
• The tension between Grassi and Kristeller is a manifestation of the philosophy/rhetoric divide in the late 20^th century.

Zappen, James P. “Kenneth Burke on Dialectical-Rhetorical Transcendence.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 42.3 (2009-): 279-301. Print.

1.    The relationship between rhetoric and dialectic in Burke’s A Rhetoric of Motives is deeply complex and intertwined (279).
2.    References Burke’s notion of rhetoric as identification to build cooperation.
3.    Definitions
a.    Dialectic:  explores the substance of a person or thing – all that ‘supports or ‘’substands’ it – from multiple and shifting perspectives, viewing human action dramatistically as act, scene, agent, agency, purpose
b.    Rhetoric – complements dialectic and its multiple dramatistic perspectives by promoting “identification” and “cooperation,” building a “community, a sense of oneness amid diversity of conflicting interests and values” (279).
4.    Identification is problematic because it operates on the dualism of “us” and “them.”  These divisions are largely – for Burke anyway – political (think Christianity and the devil/turk/infidel, etc.)
5.    Dialectical-rhetorical transcendence – wow, what a term:

• a.    It’s roots are Marxist, Hegelian and increasingly Platonic (280)
• b.    Dialectical – a merger of opposing ideas at higher levels of generalization through a process of linguistic abstraction and transformation that respects a diversity of individual interests, even as it seeks to transcend them in larger unities.
• c.    The term defined vis-à-vis the Rhetoric of Motives:  “It is dialectical and rhetorical and also dialogic and mythic – a meeting of rhetorical partisans in dialogical exchanges that lead dialectically to higher-level generalizations represented in mythic images through the power of the poetic imagination” (281).

6.    This is really a theory of transcendence – persuasion and identification are not adequate to encompass individual and group differences.
7.    Transcendence is poetic because it’s emphasis on resolving contradictions and reconciling opposites is a characteristic of didactic poetry.  It’s also Platonic dialectic because of the upward and downward movement.
8.    The pentad with respect to specific schools of thought:

• a.    Scene: materialism
• b.    Agent: idealism
• c.    Agency: pragmatism
• d.    Purpose: mysticism
• e.    Act: realism

9.    On 287 the author demonstrates how Platonic thought is actually dialectical.  See the example of the Phaedrus and the selection from the Republic.
10.    Dialectical-rhetorical transcendence “is a process by which rhetorical partisans can rise above the pursuit of individual advantage through dialectical-dialogical exchanges that transcend their narrow interests in generalizations captured in poetic myths” (290).
11.    This is how dialectical-rhetorical transcendence works:  First, the setting up of several voices, each representing a different ‘ideology’ and each aiming rhetorically to unmask the opponents; next, Socrates dialectical attempt to build a set of generalizations that transcended the bias of the competing rhetorical partisans; next, his vision of the idea end in such a project; and finally, his rounding out the purely intellectual abstractions by a myth” (291).  Think the Phaedrus here.
12.    This is dialectical symmetry.
13.    A wider “scenic circumference” can allow Burke’s work to be applicable to the postmodern scene (297).

Oct 18th 09 Posted by justin in CCR691

CCR 691 – Welch Ch. 2 for Comment

Chapter Two:  Ain’t Nobody’s Business?

Main Claim / Executive Summary

Welch engages a lot of issues in Chapter Two; however, her main concern seems to be the distinctions (and misrepresentations) of “public” and “private.”  Welch argues that because “private” matters aren’t to be discussed, the trend toward “privatization” in the public sphere is a strategic attempt to remove numerous issues from debate in a would-be democracy.  To illustrate her point Welch demonstrates how neoliberal privatization schemes of the past thirty years – instituted first by global economic policy makers and next by venture capitalist corporations –  have instituted ultra-capitalist free market reforms that require privatization of progressivist, coop or state-owned enterprises.  Welch’s claim is that these neoliberal market logics have not only damaged the third and second world economies of the Global South, but have also defined the way that publics in the US understand their agency with respect to most social issues.  In other words, public debates become privatized issues – and hence, no longer public debates – no longer arguable.  Furthermore, because success in the workplace is typically conceived of in terms of the individual in the neoliberal era, the personal (privatized) and the impersonal (also now privatized) are rendered off-limits.  This results in an individual laborer’s inability to represent herself in any manner that questions the market logic.  In turning to our students, Welch asks how we can move students from a stance of unawareness of public contestation to a more developed understanding of “discursive contestation” – or the “highly political questions of where (and by whom) public and private boundaries are drawn” (44).

Working With:

Brandt, Deborah.  2001a.  “Protecting the Personal.”  In “The Politics of the Personal:  Storying   Our Lives Against the Grain.”  The Symposium Collective.  College English 64: 41-62.

Fraser, Nancy.  1989.  Unruly Practices:  Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemp-orary Social Theory.  Minneapolis:  University of Minnesota Press.

Working Against:

Gee, James Paul.  1999.  “Learning Language as a Matter of Learning Social Languages within     Discourses.”  Annual Conference on College Composition and Communication.  Atlanta, GA.

Freidman, Milton.  1962.  Capitalism and Freedom.  Chicago:  University of Chicago Press.

Further Reading:

Frank, Thomas.  2000.  One Market Under God:  Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism and the   End of Economic Democracy.  New York:  Doubleday.

Klein, Naomi.  2007.  Shock Doctrine:  The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York:  Metropolitan Books.

Key Words/Phrases

private

privatization

public

neoliberalism

arguable

discursive contestation

Key Questions/Concerns/Ideas

1. To borrow directly from Welch, “If, for instance, it is collective confidence, organization, and creativity that most people need to create a bullying-free campus or to imagine a livable wage and a livable future on a livable planet, what literacy practices and rhetorical orientations can we match to these needs?” (53)
2. What can untenured academicians do in their classrooms to challenge the rise of corporatism between private interests and the state?  What systems of support are available to those agents of dissent?
3. I haven’t finished the book yet, so if this question is answered, please don’t read me the riot act! J  Anyhow, is Welch’s larger question in this work whether or not neoliberal social and economic policy is endangering the existence of Fraser’s subaltern counterpublics?
4. If neoliberal policy – as envisioned through the outsourcing of the US military’s activities  to Halliburton or the Chilean privatization movement of the 1970s– seeks to privatize, and hence render unarguable, contentious social issues, what can be gained by looking toward socialist regimes or other movements outside of the liberal order?  Is there a balance to be made between neoliberal privatization and state sponsored socialism?  Where does the “public” fit into this equation?
5. I have a copy of “Finally Got the News” (the film about the League of Revolutionary Black Workers) if anyone wants to borrow it.

Welch, Nancy. Living Room:  Teaching Public Writing in a Privatized World. Portsmouth: Boynton Cook, 2008.

Chapter One:  A Public World is Possible
In the first chapter, Welch doesn’t commit to the oft-repeated notion that folks in the US are subject to “stupidification”; rather, she claims that instead we are suffering from a loss of democratic voice.  She traces this loss to the rise and full implementation of neoliberal economic and social politics.  In the face of such a large, almost insurmountable evil, she positions her work as one of hope and despair (3).  To frame her study, she intends to put to work a “revitalized interest in teaching public writing” as well as a reinvestigation (a la Royster, Jarratt, et. al.) of “itinerant teachers” instead of canonized figures and institutional elites.  In considering these two factors, she hopes to put back into discussion two rhetorical cannons that she considers neglected: delivery and memory (5).  When discussing neoliberal economic policies, Welch notes that the “social turn” in comp/rhet. coincided with the private turn in economic and social areanas (think Thomas Frank or Naomi Klein).  As corporatism took root in the Reagan era and grew full bloom through the Clinton/Bush presidencies, market logic also began to strongly effect educational theory.  In effect, these neoliberal attitudes effectively made some topics “off limits” or atleast outside the realm of what was arguable.  Welch will, in her work, attempt to demonstrate historical case studies that call into question many of the principles about what we teach as effective communication in light of the neoliberal redefinitions about “what” is arguable.  In so doing, Welch thinks that “Though we can’t call a strike or launch a social movement from a classroom, we can teach and learn the attitudes, relationships, and practices that are the preconditions for imagining oneself and others as participants in social polity making and agents of social change” (15).
In the interlude, Welch illustrates how social linguistics are both right wrong concerning discourses of power.  According to Welch, it is true that WHO you are matters a great deal when attempting to enter or appropriate a discourse of power.  This idea is in keeping with Gee’s; however, the “What to Do?” cannot be answered by Gee’s sociolinguistic mapping.  Welch notes that this “What to Do?” is an especially difficult question to answer because, under neoliberal systems, it really doesn’t matter.  Market logic will dictate the “What to do with you.”  This privatization of authority and advocacy is tough to take, but a fuller awareness of the “rhetorics of power” can address this issue (or at least according to Welch).

Chapter Three:  Taking Sides
In chapter three Welch discusses the role of activism in the academy and illustrates how two strands of feminism can help folks get toward more productive acts of dissent.  In illustrating her argument, Welch traces how broader cultural events created the current attitudes toward argument and public critique.  In considering maternalist feminisms, Welch argues that the idea that women are naturally pacifists or peacemakers is wrong.  Yet, she concedes that the maternalist position will allow feminists, if they can get beyond the “peacemakers” label, to form strong coalitions.  In considering the third-sophistics, she criticizes how this strain of pomo “eschews any solid ground on which to stake a claim” (59); however, she sees the good in this form of thinking because the third sophistic can allow for a resisting of too quick of a settlement upon problematic arguments – in other words, if assertion and exposition can be taken into account, third sophistic rhetoric can let us rethink binary assumptions.

Chapter Four:  Making Space
In this chapter Welch argues for a reaccounting of the kinds of rhetorical histories and discourses we use inour classrooms.  There are a ton of money quotes in this section, but I’m going to hit this with a list of bullets:
1.    She wants to conceive of rhetoric not as a techne, but as mass, popular art (89).
2.    She claims that rhetorical space isn’t the result of good planning, but rather people “make” rhetorical space through a concerted, often protracted struggle for visibility, voice, and impact against powerful interests that seek to render them invisible” (93).
3.    In discussing exclusion of some voices, Welch extends her analysis to a treatment of “atmosphere.”  In discussing how some groups are excluded from “atmosphere,” Welch articulates the double-edged sword of liberalism.  While on the one hand liberalism preferences indivudal freedoms and liberty, it also extends those freedoms to corporate entities.  Because of this, the corporate “individual” gets the same treatment as the solitary individual. .. .. .. not the same, but actually far better because of influence.
4.    Welch advocated using the “rhetoric from below” to demonstrate how the “working class” and marginalized have fought for the rights to free expression and self-determination.  In so doing, Welch hopes students will begin to study a “contentious history of rhetoric” that illustrates the tensions between rhetorics from below and rhetorics from above.
5.    In order to more justly realize the “public,” students should study rhetorics of dissent in order to revision the long history of public space.
6.    By using the pomo definitions of a complicit working class, rhetorical scholars have missed out on the rich and varied histories of expression in the period since May 1968.
7.    By using these reclaimed rhetorical histories of the working class, Welch and her students can more effectively conceive of the public.

Chapter Five:  So What Gives You Authority?
Welch’s book ends with a meditation on ethos.  In considering large-scale problems, Welch claims that we have been taught to defer in these issues to the opinions of the “experts” because we lack the authority to discuss them.  Welch terms this a neoliberal privatized ethos in that we have been taught that it’s “just not our place” to consider the big issues like healthcare, war, the economy, and so on.  The mass media, because they have been consolidated into 5 or so organizations, further reifies this belief in experts by always deferring to the same pundits and “experts” in TV interviews.  This reduction in available forums of expression – including the spheres of the internet and other electronic communication – has not explicitly taught us “what” to think, but “what to think about.”  This privatization of ethos works on two levels – the material and the ideological.  On the material, we find the privatization of the public – land, services, resources, etc.  On the ideological, we find the authoritative experts that push these material transfers forward.  During this entire process of privatization, we are being sold – according to Welch – apathy.  This section reminded me of Foucault’s ideas about technocracies and biopower.